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HAWKS

Thomas J. Dodd, D., Connecticut.

Bourke B. Hickenlooper, R., Iowa.

Karl E. Mundt, R., South Dakota.

FLUTTERERS

Frank Carlson, R., Kansas.

Frank J. Lausche, D., Ohio.

John J. Sparkman, D., Alabama.

Stuart Symington, D., Missouri.

John J. Williams, R., Delaware.

Doves, Hawks And Flutterers In the Foreign Relations Committee

By MARVIN KALB

WASHINGTON.

AT a recent White House meeting, President Johnson buttonholed Bourke B. Hickenlooper, the ranking Republican on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and asked: "What's wrong with that committee?" Hickenlooper, a usually taciturn Iowan, who fondly recalls Arthur Vandenberg's stewardship of the "most prestigious committee of the world's greatest deliberative body," responded: "There are 19 men on it, and they represent 21½ different viewpoints."

Both men chuckled, but it was a Chekhovian chuckle. They realized, the President especially, that the committee, under J. William Fulbright's controversial command, was no longer a loyal ally of the Administration, automatically giving its "advice and consent" on the conduct of the nation's foreign policy; it had become transformed by the political alchemy of Vietnam into a nationally known institution of articulate dissent. Ever since the historic Vietnam hearings of February, 1966, which touched off the debate now raging throughout the land, most vigorously on Capitol Hill, boosting some Presidential prospects while downing others, the committee has become increasingly dove-ish — a pariah in a Congressional aviary still dominated by hawks, though their number is shrinking.

To Hickenlooper, an unflinching hawk who would rather be called an "American eagle," this kind of committee is "disturbed." To Dean Rusk, the committee is "not unified." To an aide in the Vice President's office, the committee has "lost its influence on Capitol Hill." To one White House official, the committee

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New York Times photographs by GEORGE TAMES

DOVES

Chairman J. William Fulbright,
D., Arkansas.

George D. Aiken,
R., Vermont.

Clifford P. Case,
R., New Jersey.

Frank Church,
D., Idaho.

Joseph S. Clark,
D., Pennsylvania.

John Sherman Cooper,
R., Kentucky.



Albert Gore,
D., Tennessee.

Mike Mansfield,
D., Montana.

Eugene J. McCarthy,
D., Minnesota.

Wayne Morse,
D., Oregon.

Claiborne Pell,
D., Rhode Island.

is a "disgrace, a shambles." To Dr. Carl Marcy, the committee's staff director, it is an "educational seminar, reflecting Fulbright's disillusionment with Vietnam." To Fulbright, the committee is "fulfilling a constitutional function, by holding public hearings which raise questions about policy in hopes of restoring a proper balance of authority between the legislative and the executive branches of government."

The Foreign Relations Committee has become all things to all insiders, but only one thing to all outsiders: the conscience of the opposition, a constant irritant to the Administration, a rallying point for all of the confused and disturbed critics of the Administration's handling of an unpopular war. So much have the critics identified their cause with Fulbright that the soft-spoken, deeply intellectual chairman has been hailed as a possible Vice-Presidential candidate on a dissident Democratic party ticket headed by Senator Robert F. Kennedy. Such a ticket is highly unlikely, but it is an honest reflection of the times. Just as the war has propelled Fulbright into the uncomfortable role (for him) of the nation's No. 1 critic, so too has Vietnam profoundly affected the committee's style of work as well as its members' attitudes toward the war.

THE committee, which was formed in 1816, used to be reasonably content to meet every Tuesday morning at 10 in Room S-116 of the Capitol to take up routine chores. These ranged from approving ambassadorial appointments (only once did it say "No": in 1889, when the committee refused to confirm President Harrison's nomination of Murat Halstead, an Ohio journalist, as Minister to Germany, because of a series of

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lative program, and even r[illegible] ing the Tonkin Gulf resol[illegible] through Congress on Au[illegible] 1964. ("Imagine," Fulb[illegible] recalls with something [illegible] to horror, "we spent all [illegible] hour and 40 minutes delib[illegible] ing on that resolution. A d[illegible] ter; a tragic mistake. We should have held hearings, the resolution would have passed anyway, but not in its present form. At that time, I was not in a suspicious frame of mind, I was afraid of Goldwater.")

Fulbright who has been chairman since 1959, played according to the long established rules of the Foreign Relations Committee. Moreover, according to some Senate students of the Arkansas Democrat, Fulbright had always been the kind of intellectual who felt foreign policy was too complicated for the average Senator and ought to remain basically in the hands of executive experts. "Bill is a snob and always has been," one of his colleagues contends. "He was content to let Johnson run with the ball, because he did not trust us." "So long as Lyndon catered to Bill's ego and counted on his intelligence, Bill was happy. In fact, Bill got along very well with the President—always invited to the White House, and sent on special diplomatic missions."

DURING this time Fulbright exercised reasonably strong control over the committee. The 1963 hearings on the test-ban treaty are widely regarded by friend and foe alike as the committee's finest hour in the past decade. Then, unlike now, Fulbright was in full agreement with Administration policy. Although Fulbright did not encourage the freewheeling subcommittee system of, say, Senator Eastland's Judiciary Committee, preferring to keep power in his own hands, he always allowed his colleagues to present their witnesses and viewpoints without prejudice. "Bill has always been very courteous and considerate and patient with us all," Hickenlooper admits.

In the 90th Congress, still a Democratic Congress despite the impressive Republican gains of 1966, there are 12 Democrats on the committee, including its chairman, and seven Republicans. They are, in order of seniority on the Democratic side: J. W. Fulbright, Arkansas; John J. Sparkman, Alabama; Mike Mansfield, Montana; Wayne Morse, Oregon; Albert Gore, Tennessee; Frank J. Lausche, Ohio; Frank Church, Idaho; Stuart Symington, Missouri; Thomas J. Dodd, Connecticut; Joseph S. Clark, Pennsylvania; Claiborne Pell, Rhode Island, and Eugene J. McCarthy, Minnesota. On the G.O.P. side, in order of seniority, the members are: Bourke B. Hickenlooper, Iowa; George D. [illegible]n, Vermont; Frank Carlson, Kansas; John J. Williams, Delaware; Karl E. Mundt, South Dakota; Clifford P. Case, New Jersey, and John Sherman Cooper, Kentucky.

Fulbright does not admonish members for missing meetings, though even now, in the heat of the Vietnam debate, eight members of the committee rarely attend executive sessions. Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Dodd, Clark, Pell, Williams and Mundt fall into this delinquent category. This is not an unusual ratio in Senate committees nor does it necessarily reflect political disenchantment with the committee's behavior on Vietnam. "They are busy with other committees," Fulbright explains charitably, "and Mike, you know, is majority leader."

THE problems of foreign policy were not so political and certainly not so emotional in the early Vietnam days as to shatter the committee's unity. Morse was the only member of the committee who consistently opposed the war and the only member of the Congress to stump the nation, pleading the doves' case for de-escalation and ultimate withdrawal. But, in those days, no one listened to Morse. Some of the other members of the committee, especially Mansfield and Aiken, may have had their reservations about the deepening war, but they remained relatively silent. "Everyone played ball with the Administration," Fulbright says. "That's the way it had always been. The committee had always been obedient, a good friend of the Administration."

Then, in 1965, two things happened that changed the Foreign Relations Committee: The President moved troops into the Dominican Republic and South Vietnam, and Chairman Fulbright lost his faith in his old friend Lyndon Johnson. The President claimed the U.S. moved into South Vietnam to honor a long-standing commitment and into the Dominican Republic to save American lives. "In fact," Fulbright now believes, "he moved into both countries because he has an almost religious obsession about Communism." Fulbright remembers his private efforts in the spring and summer of 1965 to change the President's mind—to no avail.

Shortly after the President's Baltimore speech in April,

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1965, in which he pledged himself to "unconditional discussions," Fulbright sent him a long memo, urging a cessation of the bombing and immediate negotiations with the Communists. He conferred at length with Rusk and McNamara; dined with some of the President's old political cronies; lunched with both Bundys; spent whole days on the phone with anyone who might have the President's ear—pleading for a policy of de-escalation. Fulbright got nowhere.

Frustrated by his failure, Fulbright decided in September, 1965, to break the old rules of the Foreign Relations Committee and deliver his now-famous speech attacking the Administration's decision to send troops into the Dominican Republic. It was a difficult decision. Two committee aides urged him to deliver the speech, but two others argued against it, fearful that it would upset his long-established relations with the White House and his political reputation in Arkansas. Fulbright said he would worry about the politics of the speech; he only wanted to have their opinions as to whether it was valid. They all agreed it was valid, and the Fulbright dissent burst into the open.

"No one but a Senator," Fulbright maintains, "is independent enough in his six-year term to take on the Establishment, to try to bring some balance and influence into foreign policy. The speech helped me clarify in my own mind that it is the function of the Senate and the committee to create a dialogue and to have a discussion about policy."

The Dominican speech created a mild uproar and quickly established Fulbright as one of the nation's most articulate critics of Administration policy. He began to read avidly about Vietnam. His staff clipped articles out of magazines and newspapers and ordered books on Southeast Asia, an area of the world Fulbright has never visited. The more he read, the more convinced he became that the President's policy in Vietnam was wrong. Still he resisted the appeals of such original committee doves as Clark and Morse to hold public hearings on Vietnam, though some committee staffmen were already sold on the idea.

Finally, in January, 1966, the Administration asked Congress for an additional $415-million in economic aid—$275-million of which was earmarked for South Vietnam. The request provided Fulbright with a reason (some cynics say a pretext) for holding a full-scale inquest into Administration policy in Vietnam. The hearings opened on Feb. 4. The witnesses included David Bell, then administrator for the Agency for International Development; James Gavin, retired general and ambassador; George Kennan, retired diplomat and active scholar; Maxwell Taylor, former Ambassador to South Vietnam, and finally Secretary Rusk. Many of the hearings were carried live on nationwide television. The impact was phenomenal. Thousands of letters, most of praise, rained down upon the committee. So stunned was the White House and so furious was the President that he quickly summoned General Thieu and Premier Ky to a high-level strategy session in Honolulu—an apparent effort to steal the limelight from the hearings. This tactic did not work. "Honolulu did not disrupt us at all," Fulbright claims.

As it turned out, in fact, Fulbright followed his Vietnam hearings with China hearings in March, 1966. For the first time since the dark days of McCarthy, people talked about China, and few eyebrows were raised when such formally taboo topics as diplomatic recognition and U.N. admission were advocated by American scholars and experts. Not even the once-feared China Lobby could raise a significant objection or attract any attention. Fulbright had made China respectable.

OF course, to many, the discussion of China was nothing more than a continuation of Fulbright's inquiry into Vietnam. One Senator, with a scriptural bent, described the China hearings as "old wine in new bottles." Most of the witnesses turned out to be doves who urged the Administration to scale down the level of fighting and to recognize the Vietcong. To some hawkish members of the committee, it seemed as though Fulbright had deliberately stacked the cards, as though he were using the committee to press a personal vendetta

against the President. This aroused bitter feelings among Senate hawks, both in and out of the committee, who felt Fulbright was not only violating the established rules of the Senate but was dangerously wrong on Vietnam as well.

Hickenlooper feels Fulbright did not give "enough time to people with pragmatic and objective views." Lausche, who used to explode in angry outbursts against the chairman, even in public sessions, believes Fulbright was "using the committee to make his own political point." Senate hawks such as Thurmond, Tower and Murphy think Fulbright is "guilty of treason." Other Senators, such as Stennis, Russell and Dirksen, have affected a studied coolness toward Fulbright.

"I was called a presumptuous, conceited jackass," Fulbright says. "I felt, often still feel, like a pariah in my own country." Fulbright, who is one of the few Senators who can quote de Toqueville by heart, fears the "tyranny of the majority" in the United States. "In Hitler's Germany, I'd have been killed. In Johnson's America, I am only ostracized."

FULBRIGHT may have overstated his case. There were fewer dinner invitations from the Senate Establishment and the Administration, but he quickly became the darling of the academic community, the fourth estate and numerous members of the Kennedy government-in-exile.

Still, Fulbright's personal stock did fall with many Senators; so too did the reputation of his committee. Some Senators feel the committee has lost not only its glamour, which is expendable, but, more important, its clout. "When Armed Services puts out a report," one of them says, "it's a unanimous report, and everyone listens. When Foreign Relations puts out a report, people ask: 'Whose report is it? Fulbright's or Hickenlooper's?' " There is a widespread feeling on Capitol Hill that the committee is rudderless and floundering.

For example, the committee held hearings last month on two Senate resolutions — one by Morse, the other by Mansfield—aimed at pressuring the Administration to bring the Vietnam war to the United Nations in a far more compelling fashion than had ever been tried before. It was in the course of these hearings that Ambassador Arthur Goldberg made explicit what had been implicit in Administration policy for more than two years: that the President would agree to Vietcong participation in international negotiations if the initiative came from the United Nations or from a reconvened Geneva-type conference. In fact, he had little hope that the U.N. could accomplish anything, but he halfheartedly acceded to requests from Morse and Mansfield for possible U.N. action — apparently to satisfy their dove-ish qualms about the war. For this reason, among others, the committee decided to shelve a pending resolution introduced by Fulbright that it be the "sense of the Senate that a national commitment by the United States to a foreign power necessarily and exclusively results from affirmative action taken by the executive and legislative branches." There was no point, some committee members felt, in unnecessarily needling the White House, but Fulbright was very unhappy at the loss of his resolution.

"We've had less unanimity on the committee in the last couple of years," Hickenlooper complains, "than I have known on it in the last 21 years."

Hickenlooper's criticism is tinged with regret. The Administration's is colored with bitterness and resentment. "Which Fulbright am I to believe?" one high Administration official asks. "The Fulbright who led our Tonkin resolution through Congress in 1964? Or the Fulbright who attacks the resolution today? What will Fulbright stand for in two years?" Another official, who has known Fulbright for 20 years, charges: "Bill is ready to give the Russians every benefit of the doubt. Why won't he give Johnson the same courtesy?"

THE President is described as "hurt" by Fulbright's criticism of Administration policy and "disturbed" that he cannot see that "what we are doing in Vietnam is essentially the same thing we did in Europe after the war." Perhaps as a result, the President has cut his ties with Fulbright down to the barest formalities. "I don't think I've had a real good talk with him since the hearings," Fulbright laments.

Secretary Rusk tries to be philosophical about Fulbright's assault. "Despite our differences, basically about Vietnam, we still transact the public's business. The committee has approved over 20 treaties in 1967, approved many nominations, and helped considerably with the Kennedy Round, the new moves on the International Monetary Fund, the Asia Development Bank, the recent meeting of the Organization of American States — especially on the space and consular treaties with the Soviet Union."

Rusk's plea is that the committee's differences over Vietnam be kept cool and professional, not partisan and personal. He knows that several committee members have attacked him and Walt Rostow as the "diehard duumvirate" which, in the words of one Senator, "has obstructed every forward-looking move the Administration has ever tried." He knows too, that he is often called a "zealot" and a "theologian" and "just plain dull."

The Secretary responds to such personal criticism with a remarkable stoicism — at least, on the surface. "I was raised in the General Marshall school of public service. As Dean Rusk, I have no comment about the committee's criticism. As Secretary Rusk, I can only say that I believe our personal relations have been normal. In the old days Styles Bridges and Dean Acheson actually used to yell at each other. Never once has there been a breach of etiquette in our dealings."

IT is an open secret that Rusk and Fulbright do not get along well, and it is a matter of concern to both men. "Bill and I will be good friends again," Rusk says, "when we finish with Vietnam." Most observers agree with Rusk's analysis. The two men have a great deal in common—both are Southern intellectuals, schooled at Oxford, who believe in a positive and progressive role for America in world affairs—but they disagree so strongly about Vietnam that they find it difficult these days to see beyond Vietnam to all of the points they do have in common.

Some of their public exchanges on Vietnam have bordered on being testy, and some of their private exchanges have been heated. Rusk seems to lament the fact that recently he has not been called into executive session by the committee. But neither man seems ready to pull his punches. Fulbright thinks Rusk is wrong, and Rusk thinks Fulbright is wrong. Rusk resents being drawn into a national debate over Vietnam. It takes time, it tends to encourage Hanoi, and it offers no alternative that the Administration has not considered. "But," Rusk adds, "I wouldn't have it any other way. This is a vibrant national debate. It's what democracy is all about."

"Some Administration officials point to the fact that Fulbright has never been to Vietnam. 'What's he afraid of?' one asked. 'That he might find he has been wrong all this time?' "

Other officials in the Administration, who refused to be quoted, are less charitable. They feel Fulbright has misled Hanoi into believing it can win if only it holds out a little longer; some feel that Fulbright actually wants to see America lose in Vietnam. "Why else," one charges, "would he go on the way he does? Why else?"

The Administration is often so bitter about Fulbright and the committee that officials seem petty, almost childish, in their own counter-criticism of him. For example, they appear to enjoy the idea that Fulbright's stature among many of his colleagues has slipped, as though this were proof that the Administration was right on Vietnam and Fulbright wrong. In addition, they point to the fact that Fulbright has never visited Vietnam. "What's he afraid of?" one asked snidely. "That he might find he has been wrong all this time?" When one of Fulbright's aides was told about this comment, he snapped: "McNamara has been there nine times; does that make him right?"

In fact, relations between most members of the Administration committed to the war and Fulbright have dipped so low that some officials refuse to recognize that under his over-all guidance the committee itself has changed its mind about Vietnam in the past 18 months. At that time, Fulbright was in a timid minority; he now leads a vigorous, growing and articulate majority.

WHEN the Vietnam hearings began in February, 1966, there were 10 members of the committee whose views on Vietnam could properly be described as hawkish, if not downright hawk. They were Sparkman, Lausche, Symington, Dodd, Hickenlooper, Carlson, Williams, Mundt, Case and Cooper. There were eight doves: Mansfield, Morse, Gore, Church, Clark, McCarthy, Aiken and Fulbright. No one knew where to place Pell, one of the most accom-

plished fence-sitters in Senate history. Now there are only three hawks: Dodd, Hickenlooper and Mundt. They believe "international Communism" is a "threat" to the United States, and it is "better to stop them in South Vietnam than in San Francisco." There are 11 acknowledged doves: Case, Cooper and Pell have joined the ranks of the original eight. Five birds are now fluttering between both camps, uncertain about where to alight. They are: Sparkman, who tends to do whatever the Administration wants but increasingly is disturbed by the endless quality of the war; Lausche, who sniffed the political winds in Ohio recently and returned to Washington preaching a bombing pause but "eternal vigilance" against world Communism; Symington, who has advocated a "unilateral ceasefire" in Vietnam even though he still believes in air power; Carlson, who is beginning to question the validity of the American commitment in Vietnam, and Williams, who, ever mindful of a price tag, feels the war is costing too much and the rewards are getting too small.

Quite often, in closed sessions, the arguments between the hawks and the doves become violent. Each hawk believes he is right and not only are the doves wrong but they are playing into Communist hands. Each dove is convinced he is right—and equally convinced the hawks are political Neanderthals who are beyond intellectual redemption. Lately the distance between the expanding dove camp and the shrinking hawk camp has grown so large that neither side bothers any longer to try to persuade the other. Fulbright reigns over this bickering brood of birds sure of only one thing—that he is right.

There are many reasons for this realignment of sentiment on the committee. For one thing, the breaking up of the hawk camp results from a growing feeling of futility that, after investing so much blood and treasure and munitions in Vietnam, the war seems no closer to an end. For another, as the fever of Presidential politics rises, and President Johnson's popularity polls fall, the politicians are beginning to reach for safe ground on Vietnam, concerned that too hawkish a stance on the war might be as politically vulnerable as too dove-ish a posture. Finally, there is Fulbright's academic style of running the committee, which has

"Fulbright runs the committee the way a professor runs a seminar. 'It isn't parliamentary,' says a colleague, 'but it's educational.'"

now begun to corrode the hawks' belief that military power can achieve a kind of victory in Vietnam.

Fulbright runs the committee the way a professor runs a seminar. He assumes his colleagues have done their homework, though he knows some have not. He appeals, quietly but persistently, to their sense of intellectual maturity and political responsibility. He marshals his facts and handles his witnesses as though Room S-116, with its book-lined walls and large oval table, were a seminar room in Harvard Yard rather than a committee room on Capitol Hill.

"It isn't parliamentary and strict," a colleague said, "but no one can say it isn't educational." And, perhaps calculatingly, Fulbright plays on the Senators' growing distrust of the President, warning them to listen to every word and not to allow another Tonkin end run.

INADVERTENTLY, the Administration helps. For example, last June 8, Ambassador William Porter appeared before a closed session of the committee. He had just completed a long assignment in Saigon as Deputy Ambassador, and Fulbright, always eager for fresh impressions, invited him to a secret seminar. Porter, a skilled diplomat now serving in South Korea, unburdened his professional soul. He apparently painted a very depressing picture of South Vietnam: The army rarely fought on weekends, and when dusk settled over the paddy fields, the soldiers began to look for women and dinner, certainly not Vietcong; there was widespread corruption throughout the army and the Government; the pacification program had so far not got off the

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ground, and there was a disturbing growth of anti-Americanism.

Chapter Two of the Porter story took place on July 26—six weeks later. Defense Secretary McNamara appeared in closed session. Predictably, he proceeded to paint an optimistic picture of South Vietnam —so optimistic, in fact, that an aide handed Fulbright a copy of the Porter testimony. He began to read parts of it to McNamara without divulging his source. McNamara listened patiently and then said: "That man does not know what he is talking about." Fulbright then divulged his source—much to the Secretary's discomfiture.

Fulbright's purpose had been served: Without any advanced planning — "Very little around here is planned," Dr. Marcy explains—Fulbright had provided the committee with additional evidence that either the Administration was not leveling with them or the public, thus widening the always-handy credibility gap, or, worse still, that the Pentagon believed one thing about the war, the State Department another, and the President was getting confusing and perhaps even wrong advice.

The committee members were shaken by the Porter-McNamara incident—almost as much as they were by the private testimony on Sept. 1966, of Assistant Secretary of State William Bundy. The Senators dug deeply into the background of the 1964 Tonkin Gulf resolution. They wanted to know who wrote it and when it was written. According to at least two Senators who heard Bundy's testimony, the Assistant Secretary was evasive on most points but he did say that he had been carrying a draft of a Tonkin resolution "in my pocket for several weeks." The two attacks on American ships in the Gulf of Tonkin had taken place on Aug. 2 and Aug. 4 and the resolution was passed on Aug. 7. Bundy's testimony suggested

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that the Administration had the resolution ready even before the two attacks, and used the incidents as pretexts for pushing the resolution through Congress.

When Bundy was asked about this suggestion, he immediately labeled it "gross distortion." There were, he now maintains, "several advance texts drawn up on a contingency basis in case the Vietnam situation deteriorated in the middle of the President's election campaign and he needed quick Congressional authority to act." But, Bundy claims, "I do not believe anyone high in Government knew about these texts—they were simply a logical precaution on our part—and certainly no one anticipated the incidents in the Gulf of Tonkin."

Nevertheless, this Bundy testimony explains one major reason for the increasing skepticism on Capitol Hill about the continuing validity of the Tonkin resolution. "There will never be another resolution like that," one committee member said. "Tonkins are dead."

BY way of this seemingly haphazard educational process, Fulbright has managed to exploit the growing distrust of the Administration among many people to win more converts to his view. The converts can be on Capitol Hill, or in Foggy Bottom, or beyond Chevy Chase. Fulbright is not choosy. Since he can no longer communicate directly with the President, having violated not only Establishment rules in the Senate but also the cherished if battered consensus of the White House, Fulbright strongly believes that the only way to get a message through to the President is to carry that message to the people and hope that their attitudes and their votes will change his mind. In other words, Fulbright is using public hearings on a score of Vietnam-related issues, from foreign aid to the United Nations, to go over the head of the Administration in an effort, ironically, to communicate with it.

It is an unusual process — one which has offended some members of the Senate who worship tradition, infuriated hawks who believe Fulbright's dissent is lengthening the war and thus adding to American casualties, irritated the White House and that part of the State Department which buys the Rusk view of the war, and, beyond all this, has encouraged the most soul-searching debate on an issue of American foreign policy since the United States chose to turn its back on the League of Nations after World War I. It is probably true that this Foreign Relations Committee will never be the same again, having embarked on a new missionary purpose, but neither will the nation. ■